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Introduction 
The journal that today goes by the name 'Public Choice' originally had a less appealing 
but more accurate title: 'Journal of Non-Market Decision Making'. The impetus for the 
new journal was apparently to make some headway on the thorny problem of decision­
making by government actors by using the tools of modern economics. Although critics 
of the public choice movement are quick to point out that government organizations are 
different than firms because government entities lack the profit motive, that distinction 
was precisely the reason for the new journaL The cornerstone of public choice, at least 
as originally conceived, was a commitment to use tools of economic theory to analyze 
actors and entities that systematically differ from traditional actors in private markets. 
Although some in the field today prefer the moniker 'political economy' or 'positive 
political theory' (PPT), the central goal remains the same: a rigorous and realistic under­
standing of decision-making in government institutions. 
This chapter sketches the public choice theory - or, more sensibly, public choice 
theories - of the federal bureaucracy. How are administrative agencies designed and 
what are the implications of these design principles for effective and efficient govern­
ment? Administrative agencies have long been a staple of representative democracy, 
analyzed by Weber, Tocqueville, Montesquieu and dozens of other prominent political 
theorists.2 In most of these studies, the existence of administrative agencies is the starting 
point for analysis. Yet, from the perspective of institutional design, there is no necessary 
reason to assume that a supreme legislature will choose to delegate policymaking author­
ity to a bureaucracy. Even if delegation to some bureaucratic entity results, legislatures 
might sub-delegate to legislative bureaucracies rather than agencies located within the 
executive branch. 
Once an executive bureaucracy exists, however, the menu of available bureaucratic 
structures will influence subsequent legislative decisions about whether to delegate 
authority in a specific instance. Nevertheless, because other chapters in this volume 
discuss the decision by the legislature to produce policy internally via casework or exter­
nally via delegation, this chapter largely sets these questions aside. It would be perfectly 
sensible to ask when and where legislators will delegate authority to agencies, condi­
tional on agency structure and behavior. This chapter, however, asks how agencies are 
and should be structured, conditional on an affirmative decision to delegate authority. 
This is the problem of agency design. 
A series of other useful surveys of positive political theory work on the bureaucracy 
also exist (for example, Wintrobe 1997; Moe 1997). Inevitably, this chapter covers some 
of the same ground and draws on these treatments throughout, but rather than simply 
replicating existing surveys, this chapter emphasizes the insights of these literatures 
through the lens of active debates in modern public law. Much ofpublic choice abstracts 
away from the actual legal environment. And while a growing body of public choice 
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work has tackled concrete public law problems, particularly in administrative law, there 
remains a significant gap between modern theoretical work in public choice and the 
actual legal doctrines impacting agency design. Instead of attempting a comprehensive 
survey ofall public choice work on agency design, the chapter discusses some of the more 
common and obvious areas of overlap, tacking back and forth between public choice 
theory and agency design problems in public law. Rather than insist on a particular 
application or interpretation, the chapter trics to illustrate the many ways in which these 
traditions fit together. 
Part I discusses relevant theoretical priors about the creation of a bureaucratic struc­
ture, focusing on questions like what drives bureaucratic behavior, what is the political 
problem that agencies are supposed to help solve, and what new problems does reliance 
on agencies to develop public policy produce? Part II analyzes the conceptual relation­
ship between the design of agency decision-making structures and the extent of control 
by other political institutions like the legislature. Part II then applies these theoretical 
insights to one administrative law doctrinal dispute (legislative rules) and one constitu­
tional law doctrine (non-delegation). Part III turns to the problem of vertical bureau­
cratic structure by focusing on the twin problems of bureaucratic centralization and 
insulation, particularly in the context of the unitary executive debate. Part IV shifts from 
vertical bureaucratic structure to horizontal problems by emphasizing public choice and 
doctrinal disputes about the relationship among administrative agencies. 
I. The problem of agency design 
From the perspective of institutional design, the optimal bureaucratic structure depends 
on the ends to be achieved. Unfortunately, as the other chapters in this volume usefully 
establish, there is no shortage ofdisagreement about what precisely those ends are. When 
designing agencies, legislators might seek to maximize political credit, minimize political 
blame, guard against the bureaucracy implementing policy that diverges from legislative 
views, reduce the risk that a future legislature will change policy, bring home the most 
benefits for constituents, serve the gencral public interest, advantage citizen contributors 
to campaigns, or protect their own tenure in office. Regardless of what ends legislators 
prefer, bureaucrats might maximize budgets for their agencies, the scope of their own 
power, leisure, the implementation of policy closest to their own preferences, stable 
policy likely to be upheld by courts, or policy advantaging influential private interests. 
Because these ends might be best facilitated by different design principles (means), at 
least some discussion of theoretical priors is in order. 
A. Agency preferences 
The first generation of public choice work on agencies tended to be quite bureaucracy­
centered. Niskanen's (1971) study of the bureaucracy argued that bureaucrats maximize 
some mix of salary, perks, reputation, power, and flexibility. Wilson (1989) echoed these 
sentiments almost two decades later. And if resources allow bureaucrats to pursue what­
ever ends they prefer. then bureaucrats might simply and safely be assumed to maximize 
budgets (Stearns and Zywicki 2009). Note that there is nothing nefarious about this 
assumption. Bureaucratic zealots endlessly seeking to do the public's bidding will still 
prefer to have the resources to pursue those ends. At the same time, those seeking to 
maximize power or control will tend to seek more resources as welL This idea of agency 
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empire building has received only mixed empirical support (Blais and Dion \991) and 
agencies do not seem to seek systematic expansion of regulatory jurisdiction (Levinson 
2005; Wilson 1989). A rational agency might prefer to maintain rigid control over exist­
ing jurisdiction or avoid entering into regulatory domains that will prove especially 
controversial or conflict with other agencies that are serving other interest groups or leg­
islators. Moreover, although it is common to assume that once created agencies persist 
forever, this simply is not true. Agencies are often tel'minated or restructured (Berry et 
al. 2007; Lewis 2002); there is a risk to agency over-expansion or under-performance. 
Alternatively, in many models of bureaucracy, bureaucrats seek to maximize not budgets 
or power, but leisure. Agents, after all, often shirk (Brehm and Gates 1997, 1993; Miller 
1992); perhaps agencies should be analyzed in the same way. Many of these assumptions 
about agency preferences are defensible, but there is a general consensus in the literature 
that we simply do not know what the typical bureaucratic objective function looks like 
(for a useful introductory treatment, see Shepsle and Bonchek 1997). 
Although the conceptual and empirical evidence regarding the 'what do agencies max­
imize' question is mixed, the answer is directly relevant to ongoing disputes in the public 
law of agency design. To take one example, how should courts evaluate agency judg­
ments about the scope of agencies own jurisdiction? When an agency asserts the legal 
authority to act in some new policy domain, should courts nod approvingly or look on 
with skepticism? These questions are encountered most frequently in the ongoing debate 
about whether Chevron deference should be given to agency determinations about the 
scope of the agency's own jurisdiction. 
Notwithstanding several opportunities to do so, the Supreme Court has not offered 
a definitive answer about whether there is a 'scope of jurisdiction' exception to Chevron 
(Merrill and Hickman 200 I; Sunstein 2006, 1990). Yet, the two main fixed points in 
the case law map neatly onto public choice work about agency ends. One view assumes 
that agencies are consistently interested in expanding their own authority, and therefore 
courts should aggressively review agency assertions of new authority. This idea was 
articulated some years ago by Justice Brennan: one reason deference is owed to agency 
interpretations is that Congress has 'entrusted' the agency with administering the statute 
(Mississippi Power & Light Co. v Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354,386 (1988) (Brennan, J., dis­
senting)). If Chevron rests on an implicit delegation oflaw-interpreting authority, perhaps 
it is awkward to infer that Congress intended agencies to define the scope of their own 
authority. A second view, forcefully articulated by Justice Scalia, is that interpretive 
questions about jurisdiction are no different from other interpretive questions. When 
an agency interprets a statutory provision it is almost always enhancing or restricting its 
ability to implement some policy; often it is impossible to distinguish jurisdictional ques­
tions from non-jurisdictional ones. (Mississippi Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 381-82 
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring». 
Indeed, if there were no risk of political bias or self-interested agency behavior, 
Congress might prefer to entrust agencies with the task of determining the scope of 
their own jurisdiction. Even in the face of divergent preferences between agencies and 
the bureaucracy, there is a tradeoff between utilizing agency expertise and agency self­
dealing. Self-interested agencies' interpretations of their own authority could be 
preferred by legislators, compared to de novo judicial pronouncements or the costs of 
legislative specification ex ante. 
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Against the inherited view of empire-building and never-ending agency efforts to 
expand authority, public choice provides several reasons to question this assumption 
(Levinson 2005). Indeed, the literature helps clarify that the 'no deference to jurisdic­
tional judgments' view rests on unproven background assumptions about the behavior 
of administrative agencies. Self-interested agencies sometimes overreach, but in the past 
several years there have been many examples of what might be thought of as 'agency 
under-reaching'. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) insisted that it did not 
have jurisdiction to regulate greenhouses gases in Massachusetts v EPA, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007). And before the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) famously insisted it 
had jurisdiction to regulate tobacco as a drug, it had for many years asserted precisely 
the opposite: the relevant statute granted no authority to regulate (FDA v Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,161 (2000}).The apparent under-reaching might 
be explained by agency efforts to maximize autonomy instead of regulatory authority, as 
some models emphasize. The simple point is that public choice is filled with assumptions 
and predictions that are not clearly consistent with the dominant account in administra­
tive law of agency expansion (Niskanen 1971; Wilson 1989; Downs 1989). Moreover, if 
agencies prefer more authority, then it is entirely rational for Congress to take account 
of this desire when designing statutory schemes. Rather than assuming legislative naivete 
and refusing to grant agencies deference on scope of jurisdiction questions, courts could 
assume statutory schemes are chosen intentionally to take account of existing agency 
tendencies. Currently, this is clearly a minority view in the law; public choice suggests it 
should not necessarily be. 
B. Legislative vieH'S 
The modern bureaucracy is mainly a congressional creation. Although many Presidents 
attempt to reorganize the executive branch so as to enhance political control or empha­
size different policy domains (I-{owell and Lewis 2002), most administrative agencies are 
creatures of statute. Although it is hard to abstract too far from the existing bureau­
cratic structure. a fundamental lesson of public choice is that bureaucratic structure is 
endogenous. One cannot simply ask, conditional on the existing bureaucratic structure 
and agency performance, how should Congress delegate authority? The critical design 
question is how Congress should structure the bureaucracy to achieve the optimal mix of 
efficiency and effectiveness (H uber et al. 2001). 
The second generation of public choice or PPT work on agencies turned from the 
bureaucracy as a starting place to the bureaucracy as a consequence of congressional 
choice. Rather than assuming Congress lacks effective tools controlling agencies, new 
work emphasized the range of ways in which Congress could and does control the 
bureaucracy (for example, Weingast and Moran 1983). Although Weingast and Moran's 
account of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) policymaking has not gone unchal­
lenged (Muris 1986), the work helped spawn a generation of scholarship known as the 
Congressional Dominance school. 
Once the terrain shifted from bureaucratic maximization to congressional controL 
the modeling strategies shifted primarily to spatial models of policy implementation. 
These models assume members of political institutions have preferences that can be 
represented in spatial terms and that decision-makers prefer policy to be implemented 
as close as possible to their ideal point. Because using agencies to make policy requires a 
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delegation of decision-making authority from Congress to an agency. there is always a 
risk that the ultimate policy will diverge from congressional preference. When designing 
agencies, Congress and the President will therefore try to create an incentive scheme that 
helps ensure that agencies implement policy that converges to legislative and executive 
preferences. 
As a result, principal agent models of various forms have come to dominate the field in 
recent years. There are two standard problems with giving authority to an agent: adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Huber and Shipan 2002). Picking the right type of agent and 
ensuring the agent exerts effort, utilizes expertise, and implements policy according to 
statutory requirements are the main challenge for agency design and administrative law. 
Because agencies generally have better information or expertise than legislators, some 
mechanism is necessary to ensure desirable agency behavior. 
There are different ways to carve up this literature, but, as Huber and Shipan (2006) 
argue, there are two main premises of the modern literature: preference divergence and 
information asymmetry. That is, agencies (often) have different goals than politicians 
or different judgments about how best to achieve these goals. Although legislators 
presumably delegate authority to sympathetic agencies, both career civil servants and 
political appointees are likely to have views that differ somewhat from the enacting 
legislative coalition (Nixon 2004). Agencies also have systematically better information 
than legislators. This informational advantage might refer to better knowledge about 
the underlying state of the world (regulation needed or not needed), to the technology 
for implementing policy (price controls versus cap and trade), or to the level of effort 
required to implement policy. 
These working assumptions are not always empirically accurate, but in the rare cases 
in which they are not, then the core problem of agency administration does not really 
exist. Agencies will simply do whatever legislators would want them to do. In the absence 
of any shirking, preference divergence, or information asymmetry, the only problem for 
agency design would be to manage the costs of producing regulatory policy. With these 
two working assumptions in the background, much of the literature has matured around 
four main themes: (l) policy uncertainty, (2) the ally principle, (3) substitution effects, 
and (4) political uncertainty (Huber and Shipan 2006). 
Policy uncertainty refers to the idea that there is uncertainty about the outcome that 
will occur in the real world if a given policy is adopted. For example, will mandating 
passive restraint systems in automobiles significantly reduce the number of deaths from 
automobile accidents? One way of modeling this dynamic is to assume that after the 
agent takes some policy action, the outcome is a function of the action combined with 
another random variable. Requiring automobile manufacturers to install automatic 
seatbelts may result in more seatbelt wear, but if seatbelts can be easily disconnected, 
the relationship might be meager. If people feel safer when wearing seatbelts, they might 
drive more aggressively. Sometimes when an agency takes a desirable action, it will nev­
ertheless result in an undesirable outcome, which means that a sanctioning scheme that 
rewards good outcomes and punishes bad outcomes will not perfectly discipline agency 
decisions. A common way to think about this question is to assume that both players 
in the game (the legislature and the agency) know something about the distribution of 
the random variable, but that the bureaucrat has better information. This setup often 
yields a result that as policy uncertainty increases for the politician relative to that of the 
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bureaucrat, the politician will want to delegate more discretion to the agency (Huber and 
Shipan 2006; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Bawn 1995; Calvert et al. 1989). 
The ally principle, or policy conflict, refers to the level of preference divergence 
between the principal and an agent. As the level of policy conflict between the principal 
and agent increases, all else equal, the principal will want to grant less discretion to the 
agent. When bureaucrats have preferences that converge with those of legislators, leg­
islators can give greater discretion to agencies in order to take advantage of the greater 
expertise (information asymmetry), without much risk that bureaucrats will deviate from 
legislative views. Although agents may still shirk if effort is costly, agents will not want 
to implement policies that systematically diverge from their own (and by assumption 
Congress's) policy preferences. Along these lines, Wood and Bohte (2004) show that 
agencies that are more structurally independent depend heavily on legislative turnover 
and the extent of conflict between the executive and the legislature. 
Agency discretion might be restricted ex ante in a number of ways including detailed 
statutes, budgetary restrictions, procedural requirements, and so on (Epstein and 
O'Halloran 1999). Alternatively, legislators might rely on ex post mechanisms - actions 
taken after the agency selects a policy. The substitution effect relates to the trade-off 
between restricting bureaucratic discretion ex ante (Spence 1999) and controlling agen­
cies ex post. Given powerful and cheap ex post mechanisms ofcontrol, ex ante restrictions 
will often be sub-optimal. The problem with ex ante restrictions on agency discretion is 
that they restrict bureaucratic choice. Because agencies are assumed to have better infor­
mation than legislatures, ex ante restrictions cannot take advantage of this expertise. 
By the same token, when ex post controls are either ineffective or very costly, using ex 
ante restrictions will generally be preferred by legislators (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004: 
Huber and McCarty 2004; Huber and Shipan 2002). The substitution idea also has some 
empirical support. For example, members of Congress who sit on agency oversight com­
mittees are less likely to seek discretion-reducing mechanisms up front (Bawn 1997). And 
in state government, the presence of ex post mechanisms like the legislative veto seems to 
produce less detailed statutes (Huber and Shipan 2002). 
Fourth, many early models emphasized preference divergence between politician 
and bureaucrats, but somewhat artificially held political preferences (Moe 1989). Yet, 
political preferences within Congress change over time. Politicians in one period face not 
only a risk of bureaucratic drift a risk that implemented policy will differ from what 
the enacting legislative coalition would prefer - but also a risk of legislative drift- the 
risk that legislators in future periods with different preferences will undo the original 
agreement and alter policy away from the originally preferred outcome (de Figueiredo 
2002; Horn 1995; Shepsle 1992; Moe 1989). All else equal, as the risk of legislative drift 
increases - that is, as the political uncertainty about the divergence between current 
period political preferences and future period political preferences increases - politi­
cians may prefer to insulate policy from future political control (Volden 2002a). Indeed, 
Volden (2002b) finds that as state legislators face greater political uncertainty, the use of 
insulated boards as a design tool increases as well. 
II. Agency structure and decisionmaking procedures 
This part discusses the specification ofagency procedures and decision-making structures 
as a way of controlling agency behavior. Section A provides a critical discussion of the 
dominant structure a 
the Legislative Rule d 
non-delegation doctc 
A. Structure and prl 
In the late 1970s and 
demic debates about 
fourth branch of go 
bureaucracy - not th 
public policy. Congr 
criticized as an abdic: 
The last generatior 
ture and process thes 
sequent scholars (for 
Balla 1998; Ferejohn 
variants, its simplest 
outcomes) by carefu 
Together with proce 
similar ends. For ex~ 
ensure that the view: 
(Macey 1992). The i 
access to the agency 
pate and influence a~ 
on the appointment, 
ex ante review of pre 
(Kagan 200 I); legisl 
jurisdiction (Gersen 
agency behavior. 
Most of these strw 
failure of ex post mo 
administrative state 
Congress; therefore, 
Because narrow de 
agency discretion aJ 
actual content or Sl 
directly, a natural 
Congress laeks the 
un surprising that 0 
act well in that dom 
(which Congress w( 
to punish) or the in 
lature coalition (wb 
continues to exist). 
(Aberbach 1990; D 
Given thechaller 
ex ante restrictions 
Designing agencies 339 
dominant structure and process theory. Section B applies these insights in the context of 
the Legislative Rule doctrine of administrative law. Section C analyzes the constitutional 
non-delegation doctrine through the lens of structure and process insights. 
A. StrucLUre andprocess theory 
In the late 19705 and early 1980s, the 'delegation as abdication' thesis dominated aca­
demic debates about the bureaucracy. Critics of the New Deal argued that a headless 
fourth branch of government had come to run American politics (Lowi 1979). The 
bureaucracy not the President, Congress, or the courts - was said to drive important 
,on public policy. Congress's willingness to give authority to administrative agencies was 
, at criticized as an abdication of constitutional authority. 
er The last generation of administrative law scholars, however, was reared on the struc­
ture and process thesis articulated by McCubbins et al. (1987, 1989) and refined by sub­
;!ed sequent scholars (for example, Macey 1992; Bawn 1995; Epstein and O'Halloran 1994; 
Balla 1998: Ferejohn 1987). Although the structure and process thesis now has many 
variants, its simplest form asserts that legislatures can control agency discretion (policy 
outcomes) by carefully delineating the process by which agency policy is formulated. 
Together with procedural restrictions, manipulating the structure of agencies serves 
similar ends. For example, creating a single agency to regulate a single industry might 
ensure that the views of that industry are especially well represented in agency policy 
(Macey I 992). The initial jurisdictional design determines which interest groups have 
access to the agency and thus the extent to which those interests will be able to partici­
pate and influence agency decisions. Variants on this idea have flourished. Restrictions 
on the appointment and removal of personnel (O'Connell 2009; Eisner and Meier 1990); 
ex ante review of proposed decisions by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
(Kagan 200 I); legislative vetoes, and alterations in funding (Wood 1988, 1990); and 
jurisdiction (Gersen 2007; Macey 1992) are all potential mechanisms for controlling 
agency behavior. 
Most of these structure and process tools can be understood as responses to the alleged 
failure of ex post monitoring of agencies by Congress. As noted, a central premise of the 
administrative state is that agencies have better information and greater expertise than 
Congress; therefore, Congress ought to delegate to agencies (Aghion and Tirole 1997). 
Because narrow delegations with extensive substantive restrictions would eliminate 
agency discretion and expertise in policymaking, it is rare that Congress specifies the 
actual content or substance of agency decisions. Absent the ability to specify content 
directly, a natural inclination is to monitor agency decisions after the fact. Yet, if 
Congress lacks the expertise to formulate policy in some domain, it is not altogether 
unsurprising that Congress would lack the expertise to discipline the agency for failing to 
act well in that domain. Agency failure might be the result of good-intentioned mistakes 
(which Congress would prefer not to punish), or shirking (which Congress would prefer 
to punish) or the intentional implementation of policy different than the enacting legis­
lature coalition (which Congress would prefer to punish so long as the enacting coalition 
continues to exist). Ex post monitoring is important, but can only accomplish so much 
(Aberbaeh 1990; Dodd and Schott 1979; Ogul 1976). 
Given the challenges ofex post monitoring, the structure and process thesis emphasized 
ex ante restrictions that both mitigate the informational advantage enjoyed by agencies 
i 
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and stack the deck in favor of certain interests to ensure the durability of the original 
bargain. Structure and process scholars have emphasized the importance of procedural 
requirements in organic statutes and the APA (McCubbins et aL 1987). Other alterna­
tives exist as well, including administrative common law (Duffy 1998; Murphy 2006) and 
the Constitution (Sunstein 1990). To illustrate, the notice-and-comment procedure for 
generating new rules tends to be long, which allows observers in the legislature and the 
public to observe agency actions. Regulated parties have the incentive to monitor agency 
decisions and the legal ability to do so because of the APA. Because agency decisions 
depend, in part, on information generated by the record, ensuring that interest groups 
help generate the record constrains ultimate agency decisions (McCubbins et aL 1989). 
Similar effects might be produced by regulating the timing of agency decisions (Gersen 
and O'Connell 2008; Gersen and Posner 2007; Macey 1992). 
So understood, the original McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast work on deck-stacking 
is thematically quite close to ex post monitoring, but in a somewhat puzzling way. 
Procedural restrictions affect policy by regulating the access of interest groups to the 
decision-making process. Procedures stack the deck by ensuring certain parties get a lot 
(or a little) access to the agency. Congress might simply carefully monitor and oversee 
agency decisions using regular review like police patrols or rely on interest groups to 
sound flre alarms when agencies go astray (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). McCubbins 
and Schwartz argue that it will often be easier for Congress to ensure interest group 
access to agency procedures and then rely on those same groups to alert Congress, 
instead ofcarefully monitoring the beat on a day-to-day basis because ongoing oversight 
is costly. 
Note that the access of interest groups to the agency is related to the ability of those 
interest groups to alert the legislature when the agency implements bad policy. On the 
one hand, routine access ensures that affected interests will know about agency decisions 
and therefore be able to sound alarms. On the other hand, a premise of the structure and 
process thesis is that this access will produce policy that reflects the preferences of those 
interest groups. If the agency proposes policy that converges with the views of affected 
interests, no fire alarms will be sounded. Such a strategy therefore assumes that private 
interest preferences converge with legislative preferences. Given preference divergence 
among legislators, agencies, and interest groups, agencies may collude with interests to 
implement policy that deviates from legislative preference. 
Hill and Brazier (1991) and Arnold (1987) also argue that the thesis fails to identify the 
conditions under which it would work. They argue that ex ante controls operate effec­
tively when the enacting legislative coalition gives clear guidance that favor particular 
choices, the coalition designs the structure and process requirements with the speciflc 
intention of durability, and courts reliably enforce these requirements. Macey (1992) 
argues that the original work was insufficiently attentive to the distinction between 
process and structural efforts like limiting the jurisdiction of agencies to one or several 
industries. 
The structure and process tradition has always been accompanied by anecdotal 
evidence about this agency or that regulatory program, but in the past several years 
there has been more of a sustained effort to test the structure and process theories 
systematically (Balla 1998; Eisner and Meier 1990; Wood and Waterman 1993,1991). 
Agencies appear to shift output in response to personnel changes (Wood 1990; Wood 
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and Waterman 1991) and organizational culture (Brehm and Gates 1996). As to the 
influence of procedural restrictions specifically, Balla (1998) studied the effect of notice­
and-comment process on decision-making at the Health Care Financing Administration. 
The agency was more responsive to physicians expecting reductions in fees than to the 
intended beneficiaries of a proposed new payment system, which the paper interprets as 
evidence against the deck-stacking hypothesis. 
The structure and process thesis is sometimes taken to mean that Congress, by specify­
ing procedural requirements for agencies is actually limiting discretion and controlling 
policy choices in a substantive way. But it is one thing to say that structure and process 
matter for policy outcomes and quite another to say that they matter in a predictable 
way that ensures control by Congress or interest groups. Notice-and-comment require­
ments may open the agency decision-making process to the public or regulated interests 
thereby ensuring agency discussion and perhaps even transparency. However, it is hard 
to imagine that elaborately detailed procedures dictate anything like clear content, with 
the possible exception of clear deregulatory mandates. And when the agency mandate 
is clear, the ageney lacks the very sort of discretion that is generally said to underlie the 
principal-agent problem. 
Indeed, procedural restrictions on agencies have many alternative and less nefari­
ous theoretical foundations. Mashaw (1990) argues that proeedures facilitate fairness. 
efficiency, transparency. accountability, and legitimacy. Thus. the structure and process 
deck-stacking thesis should be understood as one of several possible rationalizations of 
the procedural restrictions imposed on ageneies. To be sure, procedures matter, but it is 
not clear that procedures perform in the way that McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast origi­
nally posited (West 1995; Spence 1997). 
Virtually all of the above models assume information asymmetry; that is, they assume 
that agencies have better information than politicians and analyze how rational politi­
cians will structure the agency relationship as a result. More recent work has tried to 
model the information dynamic itself. Rather than assuming that agencies have better 
information, recent work has let the agency decide how much to invest in the devel­
opment of expertise. Stephenson (2007) analyses how legislators might use decision 
costs to encourage agencies to invest in information acquisition. Because agencies are 
most likely to invest in information acquisition when the new information will matter, 
agencies will ordinarily invest when they are indifferent between two courses of action. 
Congress therefore might encourage expertise by manipulating the decision cost struc­
ture right near the indifference point. These ideas build on Bendor and Meirowitz (2004) 
who show that with endogenous bureaucratic expertise, politicians are more likely to 
delegate to a non-ally bureaucrat (given certain levels of policy uncertainty) because 
bureaucrats with divergent preferences are more likely to pay the costs of expertise. 
A nice counterpoint is Gailmard (2002), whose model allows legislators to invest in 
expertise too. Bureaucrats have incentives to invest in expertise as preference conflicts 
increase, but as a result, expertise is more valuable to legislators in precisely those 
same settings; therefore politicians may invest in information acquisition. producing 
less bureaucratic discretion because the information asymmetry is reduced. (See also 
Callander 2008.) 
The structure and process ideas evolved predominantly in the context of the APA's 
procedural requirements. Yet, some recent work has also emphasized alternative 
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mechanisms that play on similar themes. Gersen and O'Connell (2008) analyze how the 
legislature might utilize deadlines or other timing rules to facilitate control over agencies. 
Many statutes contain deadlines that do not restrict how agencies must act or impose 
substantive guidelines, but nevertheless restrict agency behavior. Unreasonable dead­
lines may make it more likely that agencies reach bad decisions that will subsequently be 
overturned by courts or legislatures (Carpenter et al. 2008). In the credit-claiming game, 
deadlines might ensure bad agency outcomes that legislators or courts can subsequently 
fix. Alternatively, deadlines can prompt otherwise recalcitrant agencies to prompt action. 
If agencies, like many agents, have a preference for shirking, and if delay is an easier way 
to shirk than producing low-quality regulations, the administrative process will have too 
much delay. Timing rules are a potential remedy. 
B. Legislative rules 
Turning to related controversies in public law, the Legislative Rule doctrine of adminis­
trative law illustrates some of the vulnerabilities in the structure and process orthodoxy. 
Recall that the legislature controls agencies in the structure and process framework 
by imposing procedural requirements that stack the deck in favor of certain interests. 
Deck-stacking generates information production and delay, both of which facilitate 
monitoring. In some circumstances, this is an accurate description of statutory require­
ments imposed on agencies, but not everything an agency does is subject to extensive 
procedural requirements like notice-and-comment rulemaking. And agencies are gener­
ally given discretion about how best to articulate policy (Magill 2004; Hamilton and 
Schroeder 1994). Agencies usually have discretion about whether to be bound by struc­
ture and process constraints. 
Sometimes, however, agencies must use formal procedures like notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. One such setting is when an agency is issuing a legislative rule. If courts view 
a new policy as imposing substantive legal obligations, the rule is deemed legislative, 
which in turn implies that the agency must use (or must have used) notice-and-comment 
rulemaking (or formal rulemaking) to implement the policy. 'The central inquiry in all 
nonlegislative rule cases is this: Is the agency document, properly conceived, a legisla­
tive rule that is invalid because it did not undergo notice-and-comment procedures, or 
a proper interpretive rule or general statement of policy exempt from such proceduresT 
(Manning 2004, 917). 
Unfortunately, '[dJistinguishing between a "legislative" rule, to which the notice-and­
comment provisions of the Act apply, and an interpretive rule, to which these provisions 
do not apply, is often very difficult and often very important to regulated firms, the 
public, and the agency'. (Hoctor v U.S. Department afAgriculture, 82 F.3d 165, 167 (7th 
Cir. 1996». As one scholar put it, '[tJhe subject of non legislative rules breeds bewilder­
ment and frustration' (Anthony 1994,6). 
Some portion of the confusion stems from inconsistent usage and definitions of the 
relevant terms. Legislative rules are variously contrasted with interpretive rules, policy 
statements, nonlegislative rules, spurious rules, and procedurally deficient legislative 
rules. Legislative rules are generally (but not always) treated as equivalent to the term 
substantive rules, which itself is contrasted not only with the above terms, but also with 
procedural rules. The APA the source of notice-and-comment requirements unless 
otherwise specified in an agency's organic statute- nowhere speaks of legislative rules. 
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Rather, when describing the requirements of informal rulemaking in section 553, the 
APA exempts from those requirements 'interpretative rules, general statements of policy, 
or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice'. The APA contrasts 'substantive 
rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law' with 'statements of general 
policy or interpretations of general applicability fonnulated and adopted by the agency'. 
Read together with § 553's exemption of interpretative rules and statements of policy 
from notice-and comment-requirements, the APA could be said to require notice-and­
comment rulemaking for substantive rules and not otherwise. But the terms legislative 
rules and substantive rules tend to be used interchangeably. 
If all legislative rules were deemed legally binding and all nonlegislative rules were 
not, then an agency would face a simple choice: use more formal procedures that will 
be given legal effect or use less fonnal procedures that may inform the public and low­
level administrators of tentative interpretations, but that must be subsequently defended 
in enforcement actions. In practice, this view has not quite become the law, nor has it 
been universally embraced in the commentary. Indeed, courts and commentators have 
struggled to make sense of the legislative rule doctrine. Although different courts take 
different approaches, consider two ways that courts might distinguish legislative rules 
(requiring notice-and-comment rulemaking) from non-legislative rules (not requiring 
notice-and-comment). One is substantive, asking whether the agency intended to make 
the policy legally binding or whether the new policy would produce a legally binding 
effect independent of the agency's intentions. If so, the rule is legislative and is valid only 
if notice-and-comment proceedings were utilized. A second is procedural, asking simply 
whether notice-and-comment proceedings were utilized to issue the policy. Ifso, the rule 
is legislative and binding; if not, it is not. 
For current purposes, the resolution of the doctrinal dispute is much less important 
than what the dispute signals for the structure and process thesis. First, agencies usually 
get to choose which procedures to utilize to issue policy (Magill 2004). Agencies them­
selves decide whether or not to use the relatively formal decision-making processes that 
constitute the very mechanisms that the structure and process thesis claims control agen­
cies. This is a bit like an employer specifying an elaborate code of conduct to control 
workers and then giving workers the option of adhering to the code or not on any given 
day. Second, in instances where an agency does not get to choose, there is widespread 
confusion about how to define that set. Courts consistently struggle to make sense out of 
the legislative rule doctrine. Third, the legislative rule doctrine is a judicially created and 
judicially enforced restraint on agencies' decisions about which procedures to utilize. It 
is only after agencies have made an initial decision about how to proceed that courts ever 
ask whether the agency's decision was permissible. To the extent that courts are faithful 
agents of legislatures, pushing agencies towards the constraining structure and process, 
the system might work fine. If courts are imperfect agents of the legislature, however, 
there are good reasons to be skeptical. At a minimum, the legislative rule doctrine 
emphasizes that structure and process themes have teeth, only to the extent that courts 
effectively enforce them. Unfortunately, many of the same principal-agent problems that 
dominate the relationship between the legislature and agencies also dominate the rela­
tionship between agencies and courts. 
Indeed, if procedures constrain agencies only to the extent that courts enforce those 
requirements, the judicial choice about whether to use a procedural test or a substantive 
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test to implement the legislative rule doctrine may matter a great deal. The procedural 
analysis requires that agencies utilize procedural formality if agencies want to impose 
binding legal obligations. And this procedural formality would help legislators exercise 
control over these legislative rules. The substantive legally binding effects test, on the 
other hand, requires judges to make an ex post judgment about whether a given agency 
policy statement is likely to produce a binding effect on regulated parties, an analysis that 
might undermine the structure and process dynamics. 
If there is judicial error in this inquiry, then the structure and process mechanisms will 
constrain agencies less than their advocates might suppose. Agencies will sometimes opt 
out of formal procedural requirements and nevertheless produce significant private party 
behavioral changes. The deck will not be stacked in the way the structure and process 
theory emphasizes and therefore agency policy will not be effectively monitored or 
restricted. Additionally, the effectiveness of structure and process mechanisms depends 
partially on judicial formulation of an opaque doctrine that few understand and on the 
particular way in which that doctrine is implemented. The past 50 years have brought 
little clarity to the underlying doctrine and the courts have used different doctrinal 
markers to identify legislative rules. 
Descriptively then, the effectiveness of the process mechanisms sketched by the struc­
ture and process thesis will depend on the degree of agency discretion regarding these 
procedures, which itself will depend on judicial enforcement that is likely to be uneven 
because of persistent doctrinal uncertainty. One might view all this as a reason to ques­
tion the viability of the structure and process thesis. Alternatively, if one wanted to facili­
tate the use of structure and process tools to control agencies, one might simply favor 
the procedural implementation of the legislative rule doctrine. If procedures are the main 
mechanism for controlling agencies, there should be some clarity about precisely when 
and how often agencies will actually be required to comply. 
C. Non-delegation 
The non-delegation doctrine is a constitutional law doctrine reqUirIng that when 
Congress delegates lawmaking authority to an agency, it must be accompanied by an 
'intelligible principle' to guide the agency's discretion. If not, advocates assert, Congress 
has delegated 'legislative power' and the Constitution vests 'all legislative power' in the 
legislative branch. Although the doctrine's constitutional pedigree is contested (Posner 
and Vermeule 2002), and the doctrine used extremely rarely to strike down statutes, the 
doctrine continues to occupy a central place in most standard treatments of administra­
tive law. This section sketches a reading of the non-delegation doctrine against the back­
drop of the structure and process thesis. 
The non-delegation doctrine has been criticized on two fronts in recent years. One set 
of scholars bemoans the judiciary's general failure to enforce the constitutional require­
ment and trumpets the doctrine's importance for ensuring effective government. Because 
the legislature is the most accountable branch, the non-delegation doctrine is said to 
ensure accountable policy judgments. When Congress makes the hard policy choice and 
provides an intelligible principle to guide the exercise of agency discretion, administra­
tive agencies are said to exercise executive authority. They have discretion to choose 
among policy alternatives, but their discretion is bounded by the principle laid down by 
Congress in advance. The doctrine, therefore, should ensure that the legislature makes 
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hard choices and that agency decision-making discretion is not unbounded. The judici­
ary's failure to enforce the doctrine is lamentable on this view. 
The other main line of attack questions the constitutional and pragmatic pedigree of 
the doctrine itself. The non-delegation principle was not actively discussed by the found­
ers, nor did it appear in Supreme Court cases until the late 1800s (Posner and Vermeule 
2002). Public choice work on delegation presents a host of factors that should enter into 
a normative evaluation of delegated authority. Some models of delegation illustrate 
the dark underbelly of delegation; others the warm and sunny potential. Delegation 
can create iron triangles of policymakers insulated from public control, but it can also 
produce policy based on technocratic expertise and a deliberative process to which 
affected parties have easy access. This chapter does not aspire to resolve this dispute 
other than to urge that the best public choice scholarship shows that global claims about 
the normative status of delegation are nonsensicaL Evaluation must be localized and sen­
sitive to the institutional variation discussed above. Nevertheless, some of this literature 
might be used to craft a weak defense of the norm's under-enforcement. 
Although under-enforcement of constitutional norms is sometimes attacked as judi­
cial abdication of constitutional responsibility, in the non-delegation context it might be 
justified by an assumption that Congress generally has the right incentives to formulate 
restrictions on agency behavior. When Congress provides few substantive limits on 
agency discretion, that will generally be the right way to produce the mix of expertise, 
responsiveness, insulation, congressional control and so on. Otherwise, the legislature 
would specify a more serious substantive limit. 
More importantly, substantive restrictions on agency discretion and procedural 
restrictions are partial substitutes for one another (compare Stephenson 2006). To 
control an agency, one might specify elaborate decision-making procedures with dead­
lines, publicity requirements, and voting rules. Alternatively, one might specify a rigid 
substantive standard against which any policy choice can be evaluated ex post. The 
substitution effect suggests that as the legislature increases the stringency of one type of 
restriction, the need to use the other is lessened. 
To illustrate, when Congress gives authority to an agency to regulate 'in the public 
interest', there is not much in the way of a substantive restriction, but the extensive 
requirements of the organic statute or the APA, regarding how agency decisions must 
be made and justified, will apply (subject to the above caveats). If structure and process 
are weakly constraining, the additional requirement of an 'intelligible principle' or sub­
stantive restriction on an agency's discretion may be unnecessary. In a world without 
either the APA or procedural restrictions in organic statutes, the non-delegation doctrine 
might be both important and actively enforced, but in a world with extensive procedural 
requirements, perhaps the court's under-enforcement of the norm is sensible, on the 
public choice view. 
For most of the doctrine's history, the courts were strangely blind to this insight. 
Instead, the courts tended to insist that seemingly vacuous substantive guides in statutes 
provide sufficient restrictions to constitute intelligible principles. The Supreme Court's 
most recent pronouncement on the matter suggests things may be changing. In Whitman 
v American Trucking Association, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), the Supreme Court considered 
a non-delegation challenge to a provision of the Clean Air Act. The Court upheld the 
challenged provision, holding that the act provided a sufficient 'intelligible principle' to 
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guide the EPA's exercise of discretion. However, in its exposition of the non-delegation 
doctrine, the Court wrote: 
It is true enough that the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the 
scope of the power congressionally conferred. While Congress need not provide any direction 
to the EPA regarding the manner in which it is to define 'country elevators: which are to be 
exempt from new-stationary-source regulations governing grain elevators, it must provide sub· 
stantial guidance on setting air standards that affect the entire national economy. (ibid at 475 
(internal citations omitted». 
The doctrinal innovation is an explicit statement that the degree of restraint (control) 
required by the Constitution varies with the scope of authority exercised by the agency. 
One common justification for the non-delegation principle is that it controls the 
exercise of discretion by administrative agencies. This idea is precisely the tradeoff 
emphasized in public choice scholarship. Agency control can be accomplished either 
with substantive standards or with procedural restrictions, but the greater the use of 
one the lesser the use of the other. Such restraints trade off against one another as ways 
of controlling agencies. Structure and process, if real constraints on agencies, ought to 
be taken as partial substitutes for substantive restrictions. And therefore, even in the 
absence of substantive limitations on agency discretion like intelligible principles, there 
is some reason to think that agency decisions are meaningfully constrained by other 
procedural restrictions. This, in turn, suggests the court's under-enforcement of the non· 
delegation principle is a perfectly sensible approach to regulating agency design, not a 
constitutional abdication. 
III. Insulation and centralization 
This Part emphasizes the problem of vertical control and insulation in the bureaucracy. 
These issues have captured the imagination of public choice scholars for many years (for 
example, Lewis 2002; Moe 1982; Wood and Waterman 1994) and relate to the unitary 
executive debate that has dominated constitutional law circles recently (see Calabresi 
and Yoo 2008). Can and should Congress insulate agencies from presidential control? 
May Congress delegate authority directly to agency heads or other officials in such 
a way as to differentiate direct presidential choice of policy? Strong unitarians argue 
that the Constitution does not or ought not to tolerate insulated independent agencies. 
Doctrinally, the Supreme Court has approved various degrees ofpolitical insulation, and 
the number of agencies created with characteristics that limit presidential control have 
increased substantially over time (Lewis 2004). 
A. Public choice, insulation, and independence 
In the last half of the twentieth century, Congress created 182 new agencies (Lewis 2003). 
Forty-six percent were located within the existing cabinet, 13 percent were independent 
agencies; and 19 percent independent eommissions (Lewis 2002). Forty-four percent of 
these agencies were created with board structures like the EEOC (Lewis 2003, 47). Thirty­
one percent of newly-created agencies are staffed by political appointees with fixed terms, 
including the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Election Commission (ibid). 
And 41 percent of new agencies have qualifications that limit who may head agencies; 
approximately one-third of these require some partisan balancing (Lewis 2003, 48). 
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Institutionally, less insulation is associated with strong majorities during unified govern­
ment and more insulation is associated with strong majorities in Congress in divided 
government (Lewis 2003, 60). 
There is an unfortunate ambiguity in the usage of terms like insulation and independ­
ence. Independence is a legal term of art in public law, referring to agencies headed by 
officials that the President may not remove without cause. Such agencies are, by defini­
tion, independent agencies; all other agencies are not. In the economics and political 
science literature. however, the idea of independence has a more functional meaning, 
referring to the degree of actual or effective control exerted over the agency by other 
political institutions or the agency's location inside or outside the cabinet hierarchy.4 
Unlike the dichotomous legal idea of agency independence, the functional public choice 
notion is more or less continuous and is marked by a range of institutional features. 
More functional independence is thought to result when an agency is created outside the 
existing bureaucratic structure rather than within an existing cabinet department, as was 
the norm in the early years of the bureaucracy (Lewis 2003); location within the bureau­
cratic structure seems to matter (Wood and Waterman 1994). On this view, the EPA, 
located outside of other agencies on the existing organizational chart of the bureaucracy 
is more independent than a sub-agency of the Department of Interior. 
Greater functional independence also results when Congress places limitations on the 
President's ability to appoint or remove agency heads, as the legal definition emphasizes. 
If the President can remove the head of an agency for the failure to do as the President 
directs, the agency is not insulated in any serious way. More insulation is also associ­
ated with a commission or board structure, especially when combined with partisanship 
requirements and staggered terms (O'Connell 2009; Ho 2007; Strauss 1984). Statutory 
requirements for commissions may specify the length of term for members of a commis­
sion, require representation of both parties on the board, or limit the President's ability 
to remove commissioners; in comparison, the administrator of the EPA may be freely 
removed by the President (O'Connell 2009). The empirical evidence about the impact of 
these mechanisms, however, is mixed (O'Connell 2009). Hedge and Johnson (2002) find 
the EEOC and NRC allegedly more insulated agencies - reduced regulation imme­
diately after the RepUblicans took control of Congress in 1995. Weingast and Moran 
(1983) found that the FTC was surprisingly sensitive to changes in the composition of its 
congressional oversight committee. 
The President's historical efforts to use appointments to control the bureaucracy 
should not be surprising (see Weko 1995; Hammond and Hill 1993; Moe 1985; Nathan 
1983). Indeed, many Presidents have sought to reorganize the bureaucracy in the hopes 
of gaining greater control (Arnold 1998; Graves 1949). Presidents tend to prefer that 
agencies be located within the cabinet hierarchy and headed by appointees of their 
choosing (Lewis 2003; Moe 1989). Yet, it is ultimately the President who must sign legis­
lation creating agencies and therefore presumably the signing Presidents approved of at 
least some agency insulation. 
Principal responsibility for agency design generally starts with Congress (Lewis 2003). 
Why would Congress prefer to insulate the bureaucracy from Presidential control? The 
conventional public choice wisdom is that Congress manipulates the structure of agen­
cies so as to guard against opportunism by political actors later (Lewis 2004). Insulating 
characteristics guard against the hijacking of policy by the President or a future-period 
' 
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legislature (Moe 1989). The risk of legislative drift on the one hand and bureaucratic 
or presidential drift on the other means that insulation from future period political 
control may best ensure the durability of current period policy preferences (Epstein and 
O'Halloran 1999, 1994). Of course, the desire to insulate will depend on many factors, 
including the degree of preference divergence between Congress and the President, the 
median legislator of the floor and committees, and the rapidity of turnover within the 
legislature (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999). 
A second justification for insulation has to do with the trade off of technocratic exper­
tise against democratic accountability. Because insulated agencies are less accountable 
and harder to control not just for the President but also for Congress insulation 
is also a strategy for allowing agencies to utilize expertise without short-term political 
pressure. This is a standard account of central bank independence both in the United 
States and abroad. Insulation lessens political pressure on agencies, which may in the 
long tenu result in more effective public policy. This same logic motivated much of 
the early debate about a professional civil service versus a system of patronage in the 
bureaucracy. 
One of the major contributions ofpu blic choice in recent years has been to reassert and 
rigorously analyze the role of the President (for example, Canes-Wrone 2009; 2006). In 
public law, the dominant trend in executive design scholarship has been a push towards 
greater centralized control, either as a constitutional matter as in the unitary executive 
debate or as a regulatory matter as in the Presidential Administration school of agency 
action (Kagan 200 I). In this world of partial control exercised both by the President and 
the legislature, inherent agency problems may mean less accountability of the bureauc­
racy overall (Moe and Caldwell 1994; Hammond and Knott 1996). Because agencies 
must answer to both Congress and the President, the underlying model is really one of 
multiple principals (Biber 2009). Agencies are assigned tasks for which the President may 
favor one outcome while Congress may favor another. Seemingly inconsistent policy 
pronouncements by an agency, may in fact be a rational response to conflicting pressure 
from other political institutions. 
Related, the Constitution's hybrid appointments scheme- the President proposing 
someone for office and the Senate giving consent provides for a natural conflict or 
at least negotiation point between the two branches (McCarty and Razaghian 1999). 
When the legislature has proposal power over resources given to bureaucrats but has 
limited control over personnel, except through confinuation of the President's choices 
(Noken and Sala 2000), outcomes can be inefficient (McCarty 2004). If the President 
selects an official whose preferences diverge too much from those of the legislature, the 
legislature responds by reducing resources available to the agency (ibid). This appoint­
ments dilemma can be solved by centralizing appointment and budgetary authority 
in the same institution, or minimized by restricting the President's removal power. 
By restricting the President's ability to control officials after they are put in office, the 
President can commit to a more moderate agency, which would in turn induce greater 
resources from Congress. The basic intuition is that if the President exerts a lot of ex 
post control of policy (and has preferences different than Congress), then the legislature 
will be hesitant to give the bureaucracy a lot of resources or discretion. The appoint­
ments dilemma thus puts another possible positive gloss on insulation of agencies from 
presidential control. 
B. The unitary ext 
One of the more a_ 
out of the unitary e 
reporters have beer 
weak, or complete 
restrict the Preside 
the President have 
officials? On one vi 
removed by the Pre 
they are inconsister 
Properly underst 
control over execul 
contours of the doc 
Humphrey's Execu 
States, 272 U.S. 52 
In ll{vers, the Supr­
appointed with the 
(272 U.S. at 176). 
President does not 
legislative or quasi 
the President must 
core executive auth 
powers for officers 
Olsen. 487 U.S. 65 
Independent Prose' 
with any constituti 
Part of the con 
whether executive; 
require strong vert 
increasingly, the de 
how enhancing ex 
efficiency and effic1 
bureaucracy SUPP( 
actually requires c 
of pragmatic ques 
part of the unitar) 
The main pragn 
racy is that unit~ 
reduces slack in g 
make, then the p 
for agency behav 
therefore agencie~ 
argument goes. 
Although this' 
separate public c 
executive does no 
Designing agencies 349 
B. The unitary executive 
One of the more active public law disputes about agency design as of late has grown 
out of the unitary executive debates. Many pages in the law reviews and Supreme Court 
reporters have been filled with fights about whether the President must be given strong, 
weak, or complete hierarchical control over all administrative officials. May Congress 
restrict the President's ability to remove an officer appointed by the President? Does 
the President have the authority to negate the judgments of any and all administrative 
officials? On one view, independent agencies those headed by officials who cannot be 
removed by the President without good cause are legally uncontroversial. On the other, 
they are inconsistent with explicit and implicit design principles of Article II. 
Properly understood, the unitary executive debate is about the extent of hierarchical 
control over executive or administrative officers that the Constitution establishes. The 
contours of the doctrinal debate have remained largely unchanged for many years, with 
Humphrey's Executor v United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935), and Myers v United 
States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926), providing the key building blocks for modern doctrine. 
In Myers, the Supreme Court held that the President's right to remove officers whom he 
appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate cannot be restricted by Congress 
(272 U.S. at 176). However, in Humphrey's Executor, the Court concluded that the 
President does not have unlimited removal power over individuals who serve in a quasi­
legislative or quasi-judicial position (295 U.S. at 629). The doctrinal idea here is that 
the President must be given almost unilateral control over officers exercising pure or 
core executive authority, but that Congress may restrict either appointment or removal 
powers for officers exercising more peripheral authority. More recently, Morrison v. 
Olsen, 487 U.S. 654 (l988), upheld the Independent Counsel Act, concluding that an 
Independent Prosecutor that could not be removed by the President at will is consistent 
with any constitutional limits. 
Part of the constitutional debate about the unitary executive is historical, asking 
whether executive authority would have been understood by the founding generation to 
require strong vertical control over all executive officials (Calabresi and Yoo 2008). Yet, 
increasingly, the debate has turned from historical analysis to pragmatic questions about 
how enhancing executive control over administrative agencies would affect executive 
efficiency and efficacy. That is, does strong vertical control by an executive over the entire 
bureaucracy support or undermine government performance? What the US Constitution 
actually requires on this front is an issue for another day, but there is an inevitable class 
of pragmatic questions about the design and performance of agencies that are a growing 
part of the unitary executive debate. 
The main pragmatic justification for strong vertical control of agencies in the bureauc­
racy is that unitary structure enhances accountability and responsiveness that is, 
reduces slack in government. If the President cannot control the decisions that agencies 
make, then the public will not be able to reward or sanction the President effectively 
for agency behavior. Nor will agencies be effectively controlled by the President, and 
therefore agencies might implement their own preferences or shirk too much, or so the 
argument goes. 
Although this view is superficially appealing, it has recently been questioned by two 
separate public choice attacks. First, Stephenson (2008) shows that a single unitary 
executive does not always represent voter preferences better than an independent agency. 
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Voters (should) care not just about the average policy position of a given President, but 
also the variance of those policy positions. Insulation of agencies can sometimes reduce 
the variance of policy decisions avoiding large shifts from an extreme on the Left to an 
extreme on the Right. By reducing short-term political control of agencies, independent 
agencies might produce policy that is more consistently close to median public prefer­
ences, notwithstanding the lack of presidential democratic control. On this view, insula­
tion produces biased agency decisions, but a little bit of bias may be preferable to the 
high variance of strong presidential control. 
Second, Berry and Gersen (2008) propose that an executive regime in which agency 
heads are directly elected by the public rather than indirectly chosen by the President 
would provide greater government responsiveness than imposing strong vertical control 
over the bureaucracy. They propose that directly electing the head of the Department 
of Education would enhance both the selection effects and the incentive effects of elec­
tions. If the goal of the unitary executive is accountability to the public, then directly 
electing agency heads might better facilitate those goals than granting strong vertical 
control. 
Even if true, the direct election of agency heads might generate other design problems, 
for example sacrificing policy uniformity or coordination. The legal value of uniformity 
concerns the similar application of one legal principle in many different settings. That is, 
uniformity is about consistent application of law within a policy dimension. Serving the 
interests of uniformity is sometimes said to require strong vertical control over agencies 
because an executive without that authority might not be able to ensure that different 
subordinates always apply the law in identical or at least similar ways. Yet, in the unitary 
executive structure, there is ultimately one person who must ensure the uniform imple­
mentation of federal law across dozens or even hundreds of different policy domains. 
If each agency head were directly elected, there would be a single official to ensure the 
uniform implementation and application of federal law in a single policy domain, like the 
environment. This is difficult too, but it seems an order of magnitude less difficult than 
in unitary executive cases. 
The unitary executive advocates also emphasize that a single strong executive is better 
able to coordinate related policies and make sensible trade offs across policies. Public 
choice, however, counsels that it is a mistake to equate centralization (strong verti­
cal hierarchical control) with coordination. Centralization is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for coordination. Strong vertical control over subordinates may 
facilitate coordination, but there is no shortage of lackadaisical supervisors in bureauc­
racies, be they public or private. Moreover, the key to effective coordination is aeeurate 
information. The centralized official the chief executive must depend on infonnation 
provided by the decentralized agencies whose policy decisions are to be coordinated. 
If the preferences of agency heads happen to coincide with the 'coordinated outcome', 
then centralization or vertical control is unnecessary. In the more likely scenario that 
agency preferences diverge from the coordinated outcome, there is a risk that agency 
heads will reveal biased information to the presidential supervisor to push outcomes 
toward their own preferences. Therefore, the selected coordinated policy will not tend 
towards the first-best coordinated outcome that would be based on accurate informa­
tion from agency heads. Instead, it will be a second-best coordinated outcome based on 
biased information. This seeond-best coordinated policy could be better or worse than 
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the uncoordinated decisions of agencies without vertical control because agencies would 
then have better incentives to reveal accurate information about the right policy in their 
respective domains (Alonso et al. 2008). 
IV. Redundancy and overlapping authority 
This part shifts from mechanisms of vertical control to horizontal relations among 
agencies. To reiterate a now familiar theme, a main task for agency design is to take 
advantage of agency expertise, while ensuring that the agency exerts high levels of effort 
and implements policy consistent with the views of enacting coalition. As agencies are 
given greater discretion, there is also an enhanced risk that the agency wiII act poorly. 
As discretion is restrieted, the risk of agency drift decreases, but so too does the benefit 
that accrues from agency expertise. Closely related to this problem is the following 
decision: conditional on an affirmative decision to delegate to some bureaucratic entity, 
should authority be delegated to a single agency or several different agencies (Chisholm 
1989)? 
A. Theorizing jurisdiction 
There are two dominant ways of thinking about this question. The first abstracts away 
from the principal-agent problems that motivate most of the modern field and imagines 
bureaucratic structure to be a problem of engineering. When the same task is given to 
two different agencies, there is duplication of administrative efforts, which entails some 
redundant costs and therefore potential waste or inefficiency. It is rare to hire two com­
panies to collect the same garbage on the same day. On the other hand, redundancy 
is a standard design principle in both engineering and organizations (O'Connell 2006; 
Lerner 1986). Modern cars have both seat belts and airbags notwithstanding the fact 
that neither airbags nor seat belts would be sufficient to protect against injury in many 
accidents. Likewise modern jumbo jets are designed with multiple engines; in the case 
of a single engine failure, the other engine is typically sufficient to land safely. There is a 
cost to the partially duplicative safety measures, but it is not hard to imagine a scenario 
where the additional cost is worth the reduction in potential accident costs (Heimann 
1993; Landau 1991, 1969; Wilson 1989). 
Early work on duplication and overlap in the bureaucraey arose primarily in the field 
of public administration. Bureaueratic redundaney was sometimes eriticized as govern­
ment waste and public administration scholars sought to understand precisely when and 
where duplication is desirable (Wilson 1989). More duplication will generally be more 
costly, but also will reduce the probability of organizational failure, particularly if effort 
and errors are not correlated across agencies or divisions (Bendor 1985). 
This approach has much to recommend it, but the tradition of public choice recog­
nized that it is not quite right to model administrative agencies as components of an 
engine. Because policy decisions are made by individuals or collections of individuals in 
organizations, individuals react strategically to the extent of redundancy or jurisdictional 
overlap (Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). Political principals often observe only a single 
policy output either success or failure that is itself jointly produced by the effort of 
overlapping organizations (Holmstrom 1982). So long as agents in organizations prefer 
shirking to working, redundancy not only produces efficiency losses from duplication, 
but it can also result in less effort by the multiple agents (Brehm and Gates 1997), or 
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organizational failures that result from complex interactions of different decentralized 
decision-makers (Perrow 1984). 
To make headway on the strategic design problem, Ting (2003, 2002) uses a model 
in which the choice by principals about the extent of redundancy and the effort levels 
of selected agents are endogenously derived. He concludes, first, that policy choices by 
agents in a redundant organizational scheme impose both positive and negative exter­
nalities on other organizational actors when the policy technology is statistically inde­
pendent (generally producing less effort by each individual in the redundancy scheme). 
Second, the extent of negative externality varies as a function of the divergence between 
the preferences of the principal and the agents. Redundancy produces policies closer 
to the preferences of the principal when the preferences of agencies are far from the 
principal's. However, when the agent's preferences are close, free-riding produces worse 
outcomes in the redundant scheme. Finally, Ting suggests that, in repeated settings, 
even unfriendly agents can be induced to choose policy close to the principal's with the 
threat of termination. Such a regime induces the redundant agents to compete against 
each other, potentially producing policy more consistent with congressional preferences 
(Niskanen 1971; Miller and Moe 1983; Landau 1991). Although theoretical formula­
tions of this idea vary, the basic intuition is to create a regime in which agencies compete 
to obtain or to avoid losing resources - usually funding or staff but sometimes even the 
extent of jurisdiction itself and in the process compete away the rents that would oth­
erwise accrue. Even more simply, redundancy or overlap can prevent capture of agencies 
because an interest group must bear greater costs to capture several agencies instead 
of just one (O'Connell 2006; Berkowitz and Goodman 2000; Laffont and Martimort 
1999). 
A final view is that jurisdictional overlap or equivalently, redundancy results from 
political compromise in the legislature (for example, Moe 1989). Interest groups may 
express preferences not only about the substance of policy, but also the agency to which 
policy discretion is delegated. As policy is formulated over time, groups in one time 
period may advocate delegation to one agency while groups in a different time may 
prefer delegation to another. Over time, one would expect to see precisely the sort of 
partial jurisdictional overlap that is on display in so many actual policy areas. Before the 
reorganization of disaster planning and response, literally dozens of agencies adminis­
tered various parts of the federal disaster response regime. 
Redundancy within the bureaucracy creates the opportunity not just for agency shirk­
ing, but also for agency conflicts (Gersen 2007; Weaver 1991; Johnson 1987). Particularly 
when multiple agencies administer different parts of the same statutory scheme, agencies 
may give conflicting interpretations to statutory terms or meanings, leaving litigants and 
courts to resolve the conflict. Administrative law doctrine has evolved to help resolve 
these disputes, but typically requires courts to pick one agency as the primary one in 
charge. This doctrine may resolve the immediate controversy, but it also undermines 
Congress's ability to use overlapping schemes to enhance bureaucratic reliability, control 
adverse selection, and minimize moral hazard (Gersen 2007). 
Because the field largely evolved as a way to understand redundancy and duplica­
tion, the question of underlapping as opposed to overlapping jurisdictional assignment 
has received relatively little attention. Frequently, however, it is not clear whether an 
agency has authority to act in some domain, or alternatively whether one, two, or no 
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agencies have authority. Ambiguity about whether two agencies have statutory author­
ity is closely related to ambiguity about whether neither does. Many of the same insights 
about redundancy and team production can be applied to this problem as well. 
The implicit logic of the agency-competition model is that Congress can reward or 
sanction agencies for their failure to perform (compare Macey 1992). Typically, the 
dimensions to adjust to generate these incentives involve budgets or staff; however, as 
noted, there is also a tradition in public choice that views agents as seekers of empires 
or growing jurisdictional authority (Levinson 2005). If jurisdiction can be shrunken or 
expanded to generate agency incentives, it is also possible that Congress would delib­
erately create ambiguity about which of several agencies has authority in some area. 
Agencies might then develop expertise and assert authority in order to expand their own 
jurisdiction (Gersen 2007). As Stephenson points out in his chapter of this volume, this 
might create an undesirable race-to-be-first. Nevertheless, the basic point that jurisdic­
tional underlap or ambiguity about jurisdictional boundaries may be used strategically 
by Congress in order to generate incentives for agency behavior. 
B. Administrative law ofoverlap 
As one court recently noted, 'we live in an age of overlapping and concurring regula­
tory jurisdiction'. (FTC v Ken Roberts Co, 276 F.3d 583, 593 (D.C. Cir. 2001)), quoting 
Thompson Medical Co. v FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Unfortunately, these 
statutes have led to persistent confusion in public law circles, confusion that might be 
clarified using some basic insights from public choice. 
Suppose Congress is considering enacting a new statute to address some policy 
domain. Conceptually, Congress might allocate authority in any number of ways, but 
consider two dimensions of variation: exclusivity and completeness. With respect to 
exclusivity, Congress might grant authority to one agency alone or several. With respeet 
to completeness, Congress might delegate authority to act over the entire policy space 
or only a subset of the space. If two agencies receive concurrent authority to regulate in 
a field, there is jurisdictional overlap. When neither gets authority, there is jurisdictional 
underlap. In the administrative law context, these jurisdictional disputes are most likely 
to rear their heads in the Chevron doctrine. When both agencies offer conflicting interpre­
tations of a statute, which agency, if any, should receive deference from the courts? 
The conventional wisdom had it that such agencies have neither a greater claim to 
democratic accountability nor special expertise and therefore deference to interpreta­
tion of shared jurisdiction statutes - statutes administered by mUltiple agencies was 
inappropriate. One reason for courts to defer to agencies is that agencies have greater 
expertise than courts. If redundancy and team production creates shirking and shirking 
undermines expertise or judgment, perhaps courts should be rightly hesitant to defer 
agencies in concurrent jurisdiction schemes. This view would be something akin to a 
public choice justification for the court's lack of deference to agencies in these settings. 
By the same token, when several agencies share responsibility for administering a statute, 
any or all of them might have more expertise than the courts. To say that multiple agen­
cies administer a statute is to say that several agencies regularly utilize the statute and 
apply it in the context of their specific policy domain. So long as statutory interpretation 
is partially policy-making, agencies possessing greater familiarity with underlying policy 
issues should do better than generalist courts. 
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Setting aside agency expertise, a second reason courts might defer is the better demo­
cratic pedigree of agencies relative to courts. Similar public choice ideas apply here as 
well. To say that agencies are accountable is to say that the slack created by delegation 
is not too severe. But, the severity of the agency problem will, as the literature suggests, 
be a function of incentive schemes created by the overlapping jurisdiction statutes. If 
statutory schemes are carefully crafted, redundancy may generate competition among 
agencies, causing them to compete away rents they would otherwise enjoy, generating 
policy closer to congressional preferences (O'Connnell, 2006; Macey 1992). On this view, 
two agencies with concurrent jurisdiction will generally be more democratically respon­
sive than one agency administering a statute alone. By the same token, sometimes shared 
policy authority makes it more difficult to craft an effective incentive mechanism because 
responsibility for policy success or failure cannot be easily assigned to the right agency. 
Consider agency interpretations of general statutes - statutes that bear on the busi­
ness of multiple agencies like the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 'It is universally agreed that no single agency with 
enforcement power has been charged with administration of these statutes. and hence 
that Chevron does not apply' (Merrill and Hickman 2001, 893). Similarly, no deference 
is given to agency interpretations of the APA because '[tJhe APA is not a statute that 
the Director is charged with administering' (Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v Rambo, 521 
U.S. 121, 137 (1997) (internal citations omitted». Congress should not be taken to have 
implicitly delegated law-interpreting authority to any agency because no agency admin­
isters the statute. Indeed, lower courts generally do not defer to agency views in these 
settings. largely on expertise grounds. 5 In Professional Reactor Operator Society v NRC, 
939 F.2d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The D.C. Circuit refused to give Chevron deference to 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's interpretation of the APA because the 'Supreme 
Court has indicated ... that reviewing courts do not owe the same deference to an 
agency's interpretation of statutes that, like the APA, are outside the agency's particular 
expertise and special charge to administer' (ibid, 1051). 
Not giving deference to an agency's view ofa statute that it does not administer implies 
little about whether deference is warranted for agency views of a statute that multiple 
agencies do administer. Unfortunately, the same basic analysis is often applied. In Sutton 
v United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (999), the Court emphasized that no agency was 
given authority to issue regulations for the applicable provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), even though multiple agencies clearly had authority to admin­
ister other portions of the ADA. The Court chose to treat one portion of the statute as 
'administered by no agency' notwithstanding that the statute itself was administered 
by multiple agencies. Even Justice Breyer, in dissent, would have given deference to the 
agency only because the term at issue - 'disability' - was used both in the portion of the 
statute the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) administers and in 
the more general portion of the statute not solely administered by the EEOC. 
In many cases of concurrent jurisdiction, courts go to great length either to conclude 
that no agency was given law-interpreting authority or to conclude that only one agency 
was given law-interpreting authority (California v Kleppe, 604 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1979», 
involved the question of whether the EPA and the Secretary of Interior had concur­
rent jurisdiction over air quality on off-shore oil rigs. The Ninth Circuit concluded that 
there was no overlapping jurisdiction because such authority would 'impair or frus­
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trate the authority which [the statute] grants to the secretary' (ibid, 1193--4). Similarly. 
in Martin v Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 499 U.S. 144 (1991), 
the Supreme Court was faced with a conflict between the Secretary of Labor and the 
Health Review Commission, both of whom have responsibility for implementing the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (Weaver 1991; Johnson 1987). The Court rejected 
the Commission's interpretation, holding that the Secretary was the agency entitled to 
deference, not the Commission. The Supreme Court appeared to rely on a presumption 
that Congress delegates law-interpreting authority (today the marker of when Chevron 
deference should apply) to a single agency: 
Because historical familiarity and policymaking expertise account in the first instance for the 
presumption that Congress delegates interpretive lawmaking power to the agency rather than 
to the reviewing court, we presume here that Congress intended to invest interpretive power in 
the administrative actor in the best position to develop these attributes. (Marlin, 499 U.S. at 
153.) 
This language seems to amount to a presumption of exclusive jurisdiction: when 
Congress delegates power to the executive, it presumably gives law-interpreting author­
ity only to a single agency (Gersen 2007). Because this inquiry is now part of the quali­
fication for Chevron deference (Sunstein 2006), the presumption makes truly concurrent 
law-interpreting authority unlikely on the ground. It also reduces the effectiveness and 
increases the costs of using redundancy to control agency behavior. Such a presumption 
might not be tragic on its own, but in effect it imposes an additional cost on Congress for 
using overlapping jurisdiction schemes and the public choice literature shows that such 
schemes can sometimes be an effective way to discipline agencies. 
Alternatively, the presumption might be grounded in a democracy-forcing idea that 
is also consistent with some public choice work. Presuming that Congress does not give 
concurrent jurisdiction might facilitate greater democratic accountability because there 
is always one and only one agency that has the authority to act with the force of law in a 
given policy domain. Citizens would know to whom to direct complaints and about whom 
to complain to Congress. Some models emphasize that principals can more easily hold 
agents accountable when there is clarity about which agent is responsible for which actions 
(and outcomes). Perhaps the exclusive jurisdiction presumption tries to support clarity 
in government structure. If the presumption merely requires that Congress speak clearly 
when delegating law-interpreting authority to multiple agencies, perhaps enhanced insti­
tutional clarity allows citizens to monitor Congress and reward or punish accordingly. 
How do such schemes affect the ability and cost of interest groups monitoring agencies? 
If overlapping jurisdiction statutes produce confusion rather than clarity about which 
agency is responsible for which action, interest groups will be forced to monitor multiple 
agencies, which will increase the costs of monitoring and influencing the bureaucracy. 
Whether this is good or bad normatively, it would seem to be an effect Congress would 
care about if genuine. Monitoring is not costless and overlapping schemes affect the 
magnitude and distribution of these costs. The exclusive jurisdiction presumption might 
also be understood as a way to economize on these costs. 
The cases themselves seem to ground the presumption in the idea of agency exper­
tise. As between two agencies, courts should presume that Congress delegated law­
interpreting authority to the more expert agency rather than the less expert agency. In 
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Gonzales v Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), one reason the majority did not defer to the 
Attorney General's interpretation was that the Attorney General was said to lack the 
relevant expertise. The majority concluded the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
was given exclusive interpretive authority regarding health and medical practices. When 
one agency has greater expertise than another agency, it is not ludicrous to suggest courts 
should defer to the more expert one. Yet, this is a static and exogenous understanding of 
expertise that public choice suggests is also wrong. If concurrent jurisdictional schemes 
facilitate the development of agency expertise by rewarding agencies who develop exper­
tise with increases in authority, then the exclusive jurisdiction presumption undermines 
the precise goal the presumption is supposed to serve. 
A statute that allocates authority to multiple government entities relies on compet­
ing agents as a mechanism for managing agency problems. If Congress wants to take 
advantage of agency knowledge, but is concerned that agencies will shirk and fail to 
invest heavily enough in the development of expertise, manipulatingjurisdiction can help 
manage that possibility. If one agency invests in developing expertise and the other does 
not, Congress can give the agency that invested in expertise exclusive authority. With 
two agents exercising concurrent authority, the idea would be to design an incentive 
scheme that gets them to compete away the rents from their informational advantage 
(Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). The presumption of exclusive jurisdiction undermines 
a potentially important set of mechanisms with which Congress creates desirable incen­
tives for agencies. If Congress utilizes concurrent agency jurisdiction to constrain the 
behavior of those agencies so as to align outcomes more closely with the preferences 
of Congress, then the presumption of exclusive jurisdiction is democracy-undermining 
rather than democracy-reinforcing. The presumption produces an artificial increase in 
the cost of utilizing certain statutory structures to control agencies. The point is not that 
Congress would always prefer this regime, but only that Congress would not always 
prefer the alternative. 
Overlapping jurisdiction is not necessarily an ideal structure for delegation. As noted, 
redundancy in the assignment of bureaucratic tasks can also create duplicative monitor­
ing and enforcement costs (Whitford 2003; McGuire et al. 1979; Miller and Moe 1983). 
And as Stephenson emphasizes in his chapter of this volume, this proposed alternative 
might generate at least two problems: the possibility of inconsistent interpretations of a 
statute and a race to the courthouse steps. Said one court, '[giving deference] would lay 
the groundwork for a regulatory regime in which either the same statute is interpreted 
differently by the several agencies or the one agency that happens to reach the courthouse 
first is allowed to fix the meaning of the text for all' (Rapaport v u.s. Department of 
Treasury, 59 F.3d 212, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1995». 
Even if superficially unseemly, there is nothing inherently troubling about a statutory 
term having different meanings in different policy spheres. Chevron is supposed to open 
up policy discretion for agencies that have significant expertise in the fields they regulate. 
When a single agency administers a statute that uses the same term in different parts of 
the statute, the term may be defined differently so long as there is a sufficient justification 
for doing so. Similarly, a single agency is free to offer two different interpretations of a 
statutory term in two different time periods so long as adequate justification is given for 
the difference, as in the original Chevron case. It is no more objectionable when two agen­
cies do so, than when one does so. 
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The race to the courthouse steps may have been a genuine problem at one point. But 
the ideas embraced by National Cable & Telecommunications Association I' Brand X 
internet Service, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), suggest otherwise today. In Brand X, the Court 
clarified the relationship between a prior judicial interpretation of a statute and an 
agency's subsequent and different interpretation of the same term (Bamberger 2002). 
The Brand X majority held that a 'court's prior judicial construction of a statute 
trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the 
prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms 
of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion' (545 U.S. at 982). Put 
differently, when a court rejects an agency position because the statute unambiguously 
requires the interpretation the court adopted (Chevron Step 1), the agency may not 
later adopt a different position. When a court acknowledges statutory ambiguity but 
acknowledges the agency's interpretation is reasonable (Chevron Step 2), the agency 
maintains the flexibility to pick new interpretations in the future. In effect, the agency 
may subsequently pick an interpretation different from the one the prior court thought 
best. When a court finds that a statute requires a given interpretation, the agency is 
bound; when a court finds merely that an agency position is permitted, the agency is 
not. 
The question is obviously different when two different agencies offer two different 
statutory interpretations at different points in time. But Brand X clarifies that first in 
time need not imply first in right with respect to agency statutory interpretation. One 
agency's interpretation upheld by the courts in one time period need only bind another 
agency interpretation if it is required by the statute rather than merely permitted. But if 
the interpretation is required by the statute (Step One), the same result would be required 
no matter which agency litigated the issue and with or without a deference regime. 
Congress spoke clearly and mandated the specific interpretation. If Congress did not 
clearly resolve the interpretive question, both agencies would remain free to adopt 
alternative interpretations in the future, irrespective of which agency first breached the 
courthouse door. Like Chevron itself, Brand X is flexibility-preserving, and deference to 
agency interpretations of overlapping jurisdiction statutes is perfectly in keeping with 
that impulse. Although it remains to be seen whether the courts will take account ofPPT 
and public choice work in this context, there seems to be an emergent view in the legal 
academy that they should (Bressman 2008). 
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to discuss some of the vast public choice literature on administra­
tive agencies and apply relevant insights to active doctrinal disputes in the public law of 
agency design. Given that the public choice of agency design could easily constitute an 
entire volume by itself, this chapter is inevitably incomplete on many dimensions. Rather 
than an attempt at comprehensiveness that would be destined for failure, therefore, the 
chapter sought to at least gesture at the major themes and much of the prominent work. 
While the chapter sought mainly to take insights from public choice and apply them to 
the public law of agency design, it is also true that greater attention to real disputes in 
public law could make for more accurate and rigorous theoretical models. Just as the 
public law of agency design has much to learn from public choice, public choice theories 
of agency design might learn a good bit from public law as well. 
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Notes 
l. 	 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law SchooL This chapter benefited from very useful 
comments from Dan Farber, Anne Joseph O'Connell, and Matthew Stephenson. Excellent research assist­
ance was provided by Monica Groat. 
2. 	 Carpenter (2001) and Skowronek (1982) provide very useful historicaJ treatments. 
3. 	 See, for example, Dole I' United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 43 (1990) (White. J .• dissenting); Social Securily 
Board v Nieretko. 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946) CAn agency may not finally decide the limits of its statutory 
power.). 
4. 	 Lewis, for example, treats the EPA as an independent agency because it is not located within the cabinet 
hierarchy. It is a stand-alone agency in this sense, even though the head of the EPA is selected by the 
President without partisan requirements or limitations on the removal power. 
5. 	 See. for example, DuBois v United States Department of Agriculture, 102 F.3d 1273, 1285 n. 15 (1st Cif. 
1996) (declining to apply Chevron to NEPA 'because we [the court] are not reviewing an agency's interpre­
tation of the statute that it was directed to enforce'). However, even here it is not clear shared jurisdiction 
is the appropriate framework for analysis. At least on the court's own terms, the correct parallel is whether 
the agency is one of several that enforces the statute. A somewhat stronger case is Reporters Comm'n for 
Freedom ofthe Press v United States Dept. ofJust ice, 816 F.2d 730, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ('[N]o one execu­
tive branch entity is entrusted with [FOrA's] primary interpretation'), rev'd on other grounds, 489 U.S. 749 
(1989). 
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